Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit & Theism

August 21, 2006 at 11:15 am 35 comments

There are theists who attack materialistic, atheistic and non-theistic theories of cosmology on the grounds that these theories violate the latin principle ex nihilo nihil fit (“from nothing, nothing comes”). These same theists also maintain that the universe hasn’t always existed and/or depends on more than itself to exist.

This is directed at the theist that maintains three things (a) God created the world ex nihilo, and that this is the only viable explanation for the world’s origins, (b) the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit (“from nothing, nothing comes”) is true, and (c) that ex nihilo nihil fit is a necessary truth. Although I would argue that even theists who just accept (a) & (b) but deny (c) have problems of their own.

If ex nihilo nihil fit is a necessary truth, and traditional theism maintains that God cannot do what is logically impossible & God created the world ex nihilo, then the traditional theist has a serious problem:

p1. Ex nihilo nihil fit (“from nothing, nothing comes”) is a necessary truth (self-evidence); p2. God cannot do what is logically impossible & p3. God created the world ex nihilo (“from nothing”) (from traditional theism); p4. Creation ex nihilo violates ex nihilo nihil fit (by definition); p5. Creation ex nihilo is logically impossible (from 1 & 4); p6. God did not create the world ex nihilo (from 1, 2 & 5).

The theist that denies (1) has a problem: if the principle can be violated in a theistic universe, why not an atheistic universe? The theist might respond that the principle could be changed to: from nothing, nothing comes with a sufficient explanation. But why couldn’t this apply to the atheist too? And if not, how is it not ad hoc?

If the principle is only contingent, then how does the theist know that ‘ex nihilo nihil fit’ is contingently true?

About these ads

Entry filed under: metaphysics, philosophy of religion. Tags: .

“He” and Gender-Neutrality Hugh Hewitt on Legal Tradition

35 Comments Add your own

  • 1. Doug  |  January 18, 2007 at 6:28 pm

    What about we theist that would argue that only B and C are accurate statements? I think the “common expression” of A is to say that God created truly out of nothing, but of course as you point out, that is an untenable position. The better understanding would be to state that God did not create the universe out of anything that pre-existed Himself. Therefore we are left to understand that God created “out of Himself” Now, what the ramifications of that may be would be a fun thing to discuss.

    Reply
  • 2. Joe  |  June 18, 2008 at 12:56 pm

    Good point, Doug.

    As a Christian, I do believe in ex nihilo nihil fit but I also believe that God is an eternal being with no beginning or end and every bit of His creation is “of Him”. Therefore, there is no contradiciton between the Biblical account of Creation and the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit.

    But, it also bears reminding that ex nihilo nihil fit is not scriptural, but simply one of man’s many attempts to understand the universe. By assuming that it is true, and tehrefore the Christian notion of Creation is a contradiction, is something of a Straw Man Argument.

    Reply
  • 3. Frank  |  May 1, 2009 at 6:20 pm

    I’ve found Mortimer Adler’s writings helpful on this topic; here’s a synopsis from his book “How to Think About God” (exerpted from Wikipedia):

    In his 1981 book “How to Think About God”, Adler attempts to demonstrate God as the exnihilator of the cosmos. The steps taken to demonstrate this are as follows:

    1. The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause

    2. The cosmos as a whole exists

    3. The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent (meaning that it needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from being annihilated, or reduced to nothing)

    4. If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God

    Two of the four premises, the first and the last, appear to be true with certitude. The second is true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the one remaining premise, the third, is also true beyond a reasonable doubt, then we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that God exists and acts to sustain the cosmos in existence.

    The reason we can conceive the cosmos as being radically rather than superficially contingent is due to the fact that the cosmos which now exists is only one of many possible universes that might have in fact existed in the past, and might still exist in the future. This is not to say that any cosmos other than this one ever did exist in the past, or ever will exist in the future. It is not necessary to go that far in order to say that other universes might have existed in the past and might exist in the future. If other universes are possible, than this one also is merely possible, not necessary.

    In other words, the universe as we know it today is not the only universe that can ever exist in time. How do we know that the present cosmos is only a possible universe (one of many possibilities that might exist), and not a necessary universe (the only one that can ever exist)? We can infer it from the fact that the arrangement and disarray, the order and disorder, of the present cosmos might have been otherwise. That it might have been different from what it is. There is no compelling reason to think that the natural laws which govern the present cosmos are the only possible natural laws. The cosmos as we know it manifests chance and random happenings, as well as lawful behavior. Even the electrons and protons, which are thought to be imperishable once they exist as the building blocks of the present cosmos, might not be the building blocks for a different cosmos.

    The next step in the argument is the crucial one. It consists in saying that whatever might have been otherwise in shape or structure is something that also might not exist at all. That which cannot be otherwise also cannot not exist; and conversely, what necessarily exists can not be otherwise than it is. Therefore, a cosmos which can be otherwise is one that also cannot be; and conversely, a cosmos that is capable of not existing at all is one that can be otherwise than it now is.

    Applying this insight to the fact that the existing cosmos is merely one of a plurality of possible universes, we come to the conclusion that the cosmos, radically contingent in existence, would not exist at all were its existence not caused. A merely possible cosmos cannot be an uncaused cosmos. A cosmos that is radically contingent in existence, and needs a cause of that existence, needs a supernatural cause, one that exists and acts to exnihilate this merely possible cosmos, thus preventing the realization of what is always possible for merely a possible cosmos, namely, its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness.

    Adler finishes by pointing out that the conclusion reached conforms to Ockham’s rule (the rule which states that we are justified in positing or asserting the real existence of unobserved or unobservable entities if-and only-if their real existence is indispensable for the explanation of observable phenomena) because we have found it necessary to posit the existence of God, the Supreme Being, in order to explain what needs to be explained-the actual existence here and now of a merely possible cosmos. The argument also appeals to the principle of sufficient reason.

    Adler stressed that even with this conclusion, God’s existence cannot be proven or demonstrated, but only established as true beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in a recent re-review of the argument, John Cramer concluded that recent developments in cosmology appear to converge with and support Adler’s argument, and that in light of such theories as the multiverse, the argument is no worse for the wear and may, indeed, now be judged somewhat more probable than it was originally.

    Reply
  • 4. Mike  |  April 18, 2010 at 2:55 am

    I don’t accept the premise that God cannot do what is logically impossible. For most, raising Jesus from the dead is logically impossible and it is the basis of Christianity. God is a supernatural being who does supernatural things. Most people who refuse to believe in the supernatural do so because they see it as logically impossible, yet it is readily acceptable to the evangelical Christian.
    What God will not do are things that are mutually exclusive. He will not make a square circle or a rock that is so big he cannot lift it. Since God is the embodiment of all wisdom, I believe the scriptures tells us that He would call the idea that He cannot do what is logically impossible foolishness.

    Reply
  • 5. Daniel  |  March 17, 2011 at 9:40 am

    in your premise though there is one misconception, theists believe that God is capable of anything and is not governed by anything but that He governs.

    speaking from an impartial perspective , even descartes who conseptualized ex nihilo , speaks and even insists on Gods absolute freedom in creation.

    Reply
  • 6. Fred  |  May 15, 2011 at 6:12 pm

    Jimmy’s analysis and arguments are straight forward while the follow up ones are round about built upon a preconceived conclusion. The counter arguments do not address the question “if ex nihilo nihil fit” is not incompatible with the concept of a supernatural being or force, then the same must also not be incompatible with the concept of non-existence of one. So the argument goes both ways.

    Reply
  • 7. Victor  |  January 30, 2012 at 7:48 am

    First point, We aren’t going back far enough (seriously). If in fact “ex nihilo nihil fit” (“from nothing, nothing comes”) is a necessary truth, and nothing comes from nothing then we are left with a particularly messy task of explaining where God comes from . . . What are our actual thoughts made of? I’m not referring to the brain or its electrochemical processes, I mean the actual thoughts . . .

    When we sleep and dream at night, what eyes are we looking through in our dreams? What Universe are we interacting within? Perhaps we are in fact nothing but the natural order of things . . . God is the Bell that rings, and We are the ringing of the Bell. Cause and effect inextricably linked, remove either and both cease. We all take our perfect center at the same point. We are what IS, not what is experienced or imagined. If God is limitless and infinite, then it is simply impossible for It to create anything that is NOT self, for to do so would mean that there is a point where God ends and the something else begins . . .

    Perhaps there was NEVER a Creation. This is simply an idea, a thought, but n NOT a feeble human thought from a feeble human mind, But something that cannot even be truly imagined from this place we call home . . . Think about it for a minute, if our feeble human mind is capable of creating an entire cosmos to orchestrate our dreams every night, what could a truly dimensionless mind hold in focused manifestation in thought (again NOT human thought). Think about just how real some of our dreams appear to us, not to mention that we can create them “in-process” . . . No need for some initial spark and then trillions of eons of build-up so we can ice ourselves in some imagined nuclear wipe-out? Naw, just a bad dream. But in this case the dream has come to believe that it is in fact the dreamer . . . It’s time to come awake . . .

    If we are not awake to ourselves, then just who or what is it that we are calling “self”? It certainly is NOT who or what we truly are . . . Or it wouldn’t be continuously trying to destroy us, for this too is a necessary truth, that nothing can continuously act against itself and survive (A house divided against itself cannot stand). Yet here we are instant to instant believing from a mind (not a real mind, a human mind) divided against itself who’s ultimate goal is destruction of the host . . . Have you ever had your mind tell you to do something, and then tell you what an idiot you are for doing it?

    Reply
  • 8. Bee  |  January 30, 2012 at 6:44 pm

    This is ridiculous.

    Reply
    • 9. Victor  |  January 31, 2012 at 5:32 am

      And your point?

      Reply
  • 10. MichaelM  |  August 3, 2012 at 6:57 pm

    http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/archange.htm

    I’m still reading more but Aristotle seems to address the issue farily well.

    Reply
    • 11. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  March 29, 2013 at 3:29 pm

      The history of philosophy according to me: Plato asked the questions. Aristotle answered them. Everything since is either plagiarism or error.

      Reply
  • 12. @temitidayo  |  January 25, 2013 at 4:07 am

    In the book of Genesis,it says God moulded man with dust then breathe in it(dust man) the breathe of life making the “dust man” a living being,the moral of the story is God did not create man ex nihilo,he moulded him from dust then the breathe follows (ashes to ashes they say at funerals) …Want to ask me where the dust came from? God is a spiritual being whose ways are mysterious,human beings are contingent beings so we can not fully comprehend the mysteriousness(so to say) of a spiritual being…The more we try the more we get confused because spiritual and physical are two distinct realms…Who programmed the movement of the sun/moon,day/night,winter/summer etc? These knowledge goes beyond the knowledge of the watch makers,computer makers,internet makers,robot makers etc…In addendum,ex nihilo nihik fit is necessarily true,and we can only discuss it with God,when we fully know the “WHATNESS” of God? WHO KNOWS THE WHATNESS OF GOD ?
    This is just the contribution of student of philosophy in Africa,Nigeria to be precised,so its opened to further criticisms…thanks

    Reply
  • 13. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  March 29, 2013 at 3:44 pm

    Maybe “ex nihilo nihil fit” isn’t quite right, since: even absent everything, “2 + 2 = 4″ is (or would be) true. Similarly, “the set of all objects that aren’t members of themselves is a member of itself” is (or would be) true if false or false if true, and contradictory in either case. But “ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet,” a.k.a. the principle of explosion.

    Reply
    • 14. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  March 30, 2013 at 3:39 pm

      (Cont.) Some might object to the quasi-Platonism of the claim that absent everything, still the necessary truths (undeniable w/o contradiction) exist or hold sway in some abstract sense. No, they might want to say, absent everything means absent truth too. I.e., in nothingness there is no truth. –Which is false if true or true if false, once again, and contradictory in either case. –Whence again, ex contradiction sequitur quodlibet.

      Reply
  • 15. Bruno  |  July 12, 2013 at 8:41 am

    Nice try, but there is an equivocation on the usage of the word “nothing”. The word does not mean the same thing in both sentences. “Creatio ex nihilo” simply means that there was no MATERIAL cause, that is, there was no “building block” for the universe to be made of. “Ex nihilo, nihil fit”, means “nothing” in the absolute sense: no material, formal, efficient nor final cause. The same word is used in two different senses, the conclusion does not follow.

    Reply
    • 16. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 12, 2013 at 1:42 pm

      Okay, Bruno! Let me try it again, this way. Why is there something rather than nothing? — without divine intervention. Because: If there could be nothing, then the proposition could be true that: “It is not the case that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of any sort.” Which proposition, hence, entity of some sort, would always need to be false. So there can’t be nothing, which is why there’s something, if only on the assumption (to which we’ve always-already committed ourselves anyway) that the LNC is a principle, not just of thought, but also of being. Or again, that the LNC is not just regulative but constitutive, as Kant liked to say (CPR B222). Or again, that the LNC is true.

      To which you’ll want to say, maybe, that your nihil expunges the LNC itself. In which case, you’ll be both saying and not saying that it both does and doesn’t.

      Reply
      • 17. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 12, 2013 at 1:52 pm

        “Without divine intervention” should have been “Without divine intervention à la theism.° Divine à la Aristotelian deism is more my line.

      • 18. Bruno  |  July 12, 2013 at 6:18 pm

        Sorry, Ken, but I don’t see you dealing with the problem here. My point is that there is an equivocation implied on your syllogism. P4 is patently false, since “nihilo” does not have the same meaning on both:
        Ex nihilo, nihil fit => no-thing comes out of the absolute nothing.
        Creatio ex nihilo => the world was created without any previous material (out of no-material-thing), not out of the absolute nothing.
        As you might know, classically, there are 4 possible meanings for the word “nothing”: “nihilo” doesn’t have the same meaning here.
        And if there is no contradiction, as postulates by p4, then p5 does not follow and p6 never arises.

        Not to mention that P2 is also problematic, for a theist doesn’t need to be compromised with the assertion that “God cannot do what is logically impossible”. Descartes himself defined omnipotence as the faculty to make contradictions true, which is the very opposite of that premise. I also don’t quite see how would Aquinas definition of omnipotence be touched by that premise…

        So, what stands out of that syllogism is p1 and p3, and only the equivocation of its terms create the others premises… So, I don’t quite see any “serious problem”. That’s my point.

        Pardon my bad English.

        Bruno.

      • 19. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 13, 2013 at 1:55 pm

        You’re right, Bruno. I’m not dealing with the problem here, or rather, the problem to which your remarks are addressed. The axe I’m grinding is another axe. And what’s this about bad English?

      • 20. Bruno  |  July 13, 2013 at 9:31 pm

        “You’re right, Bruno. I’m not dealing with the problem here, or rather, the problem to which your remarks are addressed. The axe I’m grinding is another axe. And what’s this about bad English?”

        Oh, I see. So, do you agree with my remarks about p4, p5, p6 and p2?

        And I’m not sure if I got your “another axe” right. Are you suggesting that it is necessary that there is something rather than nothing? How so?

  • 21. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 13, 2013 at 10:05 pm

    (1) “So, do you agree with my remarks about p4, p5, p6 and p2?”

    I’m sorry Bruno, but I think your question needs to be addressed to Jimmy. I haven’t been following the relevant back and forth.

    (2) “Are you suggesting that it is necessary that there is something rather than nothing? How so?”

    Yes! Because: Possibly, nothing IFF possibly, the proposition is true that: “It is not the case that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of any sort.” Which proposition, inasmuch as it’s an entity of some sort, always needs to be false. So there can’t be nothing, which is why there can’t but be something, if only on the assumption (to which we’ve always-already — immer schon — committed ourselves anyway, let’s not kid ourselves) that the LNC is not just of a logical principle (principle of thought), but an ontological principle (principle of being). Or again, that the LNC is not just regulative but constitutive, as Kant liked to say (CPR B222). Or again, that the LNC is true.

    Reply
    • 22. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 13, 2013 at 10:19 pm

      P.S. For me, the “being of the beings,” as Aristotle (my hero) used to say, is logic, which “needs to take care of itself,” as Wittgenstein used to say, just taking care of itself.

      Reply
      • 23. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 13, 2013 at 10:22 pm

        P.P.S. Crazy, hunh?

      • 24. a133839297  |  July 17, 2013 at 6:30 pm

        “In any possible world, then, Nothing IFF the proposition (P) is true: “It is not the case that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of any sort.” But P (hence, entity of some sort) is necessarily false in any possible world — just because P is the entity that it is. But if so, then P’s contradictory is a necessary truth, namely, that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of some sort. Necessarily, then, Something in any possible world.”

        I now see your argument more clearly. But I still disagree with you. Let me try: P is not a NECESSARY entity of any sort. Why would P be present in every possible world? I mean, if it is not necessary, then, P can indeed be true, namely, in a world where P does not exist. Now, let me put it this way: by “world” I mean “a description of reality”: in a description of reality where there is no P, P would be true about that world/description of reality. Hence, there could be nothing and it is not necessary that there is something, because P is not necessary.

      • 25. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 18, 2013 at 12:00 pm

        Re your: I now see your argument more clearly. But I still disagree with you. Let me try: P is not a NECESSARY entity of any sort. Why would P be present in every possible world? I mean, if it is not necessary, then, P can indeed be true, namely, in a world where P does not exist. Now, let me put it this way: by “world” I mean “a description of reality”: in a description of reality where there is no P, P would be true about that world/description of reality. Hence, there could be nothing and it is not necessary that there is something, because P is not necessary.

        Dear Bruno,

        I’m beginning to think our back-and-forth has outlived its value-added. Can I ask you to examine my argument again? Or maybe there’s an unexamined/unselfconscious presupposition getting in someone’s way (whether yours or mine).

        Ken

      • 26. a133839297  |  July 19, 2013 at 6:36 am

        Sorry if I was not clear, actually where I said “P can indeed be true”, I meant false. But yes, I believe that there is an unexamined presupposition, namely: that P exists in every possible world. You seem to assume that. You say that there can’t be nothing and there must be, necessarily, something because P itself is an entity of some sort and simply stating P makes P true. Ok, I grant that. But I deny the fact that P exists in every possible world, the implication being that in a world without P, P would be false about that world, since that world does not contain P nor anything else! So there could be absolutely nothing and it is not necessary that there is something! You could say that such a world would not a world because it has nothing, but that would be begging the question.

    • 27. Bruno  |  July 13, 2013 at 10:41 pm

      I hope I got it straight, let’s see: I do accept LNC as a logical and ontological principle, and I can’t imagine anyone denying it without using the LNC to do so, ie, without being caught in a contradiction. So far so good.
      I also agree that there can’t be “nothing” or, absolute nothing, IN THIS WORLD. But I can’t go along to say that it is true in every possible world, ie, that it is necessarily so. I mean: “ex nihilo, nihil fit”, and since there is something IN THIS WORLD, there can’t be “nihilo”: there must be at least one being. I agree with that, but I don’t see it as necessary, there could be a world without nothing, a “non-world”, there could be nothing, but there isn’t. It does not seem necessary to me that there could not be nothing, though. I’d like to see some argument about it’s necessity…

      Pardon my bad English.

      Bruno.

      Reply
      • 28. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 17, 2013 at 3:58 pm

        In any possible world, then, Nothing IFF the proposition (P) is true: “It is not the case that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of any sort.” But P (hence, entity of some sort) is necessarily false in any possible world — just because P is the entity that it is. But if so, then P’s contradictory is a necessary truth, namely, that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of some sort. Necessarily, then, Something in any possible world.

        I’ll pardon your bad English when I see it, which I don’t, so I won’t.

  • 29. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 19, 2013 at 11:40 pm

    “You say that there can’t be nothing and there must be, necessarily, something because P itself is an entity of some sort and simply stating P makes P true.”

    No, Bruno. (1) P is an entity of some sort whether stated or not. And (2) inasmuch as P is an entity of some sort, whether stated or not, it is necessarily false.

    Reply
    • 30. a133839297  |  July 20, 2013 at 12:38 am

      So, you DO affirm that P exist in every possible world, since “it is an entity of some sort whether stated or not”? I deny that “P is an entity of some sort whether stated or not.”.

      Now, maybe, I’m misusing the word “stated”, since I’m not a native English speaker, and this could be our source of misunderstanding. I’ll try, then, to clarify what I mean: when I say “not stated” I mean not postulated in the sense that P wasn’t even thought, and that indeed would be the case if there was nothing at all. There would be nothing and nobody to think of, or state, P! How would a proposition that was not stated and not even thought be an entity of some sort? That would be a non-existing-proposition, which would not be an entity of any sort, neither as thought, neither as a potential proposition (because nothing has no potentiality, neither for P!).

      What “entity” would a non-postulated-non-stated-not-thought-of proposition be? That seems to me like the definition of a non-proposition.

      Bruno.

      Reply
      • 31. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 20, 2013 at 4:25 pm

        This is pointless, Bruno. Please reread: Nothing IFF (if and only if) the proposition (let’s call it P) is true that: “It is not the case that there exists at least one x such that x is an entity of any sort.” But P is necessarily false, just because it is already an entity of some sort, whether thought, etc., or not. But if P is a necessary falsehood, whether thought, etc, or not, not-P is a necessary truth, whether thought, etc., or not. Therefore necessarily not-Nothing (i.e., Something).

        Best of luck, Bruno. Let’s both of us get a life! as they say.

    • 32. a133839297  |  July 20, 2013 at 7:58 pm

      “But P is necessarily false, just because it is already an entity of some sort, whether thought, etc., or not.”

      How would a proposition that was not stated and not even thought be an entity of some sort? That would be a non-existing-proposition, which would not be an entity of any sort, neither as thought, neither as a potential proposition (because nothing has no potentiality, neither for P!).

      Reply
      • 33. Ken Bronfenbrenner  |  July 20, 2013 at 9:48 pm

        “That would be a non-existing-proposition, which would not be an entity of any sort, neither as thought, neither as a potential proposition (because nothing has no potentiality, neither for P!).”

        Oh? And is that (italicized) true?

    • 34. a133839297  |  July 21, 2013 at 12:45 am

      “Oh? And is that (italicized) true?”

      How would something that does not exist be true or false?

      Reply
      • 35. Chaz  |  January 5, 2014 at 5:55 pm

        The Cosmological Argument applies pure logic to demonstrate that nothing could exist unless an “uncaused cause” or something that was self-existent and eternal, originated or created everything. Under the Universal Law of Cause and Effect, every effect must have an antecedent cause, and likewise by definition, every cause requires a corresponding effect. However, self-existence, or the ability for something to exist in and of itself (i.e., aseity) without dependency upon something else, is not an effect, but a property of being. Therefore self-existence does not need (and by definition cannot have) a cause. This is not an impossible or even improbable concept, but rather is compulsory for anything to exist. It should also be noted here that the concept of self-existence is consistent with, and does not violate any of the laws of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, epistemology or ontology. Self-existence by definition also requires that any self-existent “force” or “being” is eternal since it can have no beginning or it would have to depend upon something else to exist. Just as with the concept of infinity, this may be difficult for finite beings like us to fully grasp, however self-existence is not only possible but necessary.

        Self-existence of the universe would require that the universe itself, is eternal. If it is not, it would have to of been created and brought into existence at some point. However, we know from the natural laws of science and broad supporting scientific observations that the universe did have a beginning. Conclusive evidence for the origin of our physical reality, include commonly recognized scientific phenomena and data from Cosmology, Astronomy and Physics. This evidence clearly demonstrates the universe, including its dimensional framework of space and time, all of its constituents, including all the natural laws that govern it, expanded from a point of singularity that lept into existence at the initiation of the “Big Bang” event. This commonly accepted theory for the birth of the universe is broadly supported by contemporary scientific thought and natural evidence including numerous scientific discoveries, observations, phenomena and measurements. such as: intergalactic space expansion rates (from the cosmological redshift of Hubble data and Tolman tests), and the existence of (and fluctuations in) the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMBR) that is the remnant afterglow from the Big Bang; the large-scale homogeneity (uniform structure) & isotropy (uniform in all observable directions) of the universe; abundances of light elements; the age of stars; the evolution of galaxies; time dilation in supernova brightness curves; the Sunyaev-Zel’dovich effect; Integrated Sachs-Wolfe effect; Dark Matter theory; and Dark Energy theory. Also important is the recent and long awaited discovery of the Higgs Boson (s.k.a. the “God particle”) supporting particle physics theory, quantum mechanics and the standard model.

        In addition, the laws of physics tell us that the constant movement, motion and changing forms of matter and energy in the universe have important implications. Newton’s first Law of Motion states that every object in a state of rest or uniform motion will remain in that state unless acted upon by an external force. The Second Law of Thermodynamics, first formulated by French scientist Sadi Carnot in 1824, states that the energy of entropy or “disorder” always increases as time progresses. These natural laws of science along with broad-based physical observations tell us that the universe is unstable and in a state of continual change (from movement, expansion, energy transfer, and changing states of matter and energy, etc.) as it moves from a state of order to disorder or chaos. Therefore, the universe or natural world manifests change (i.e. – mutability), and is in a process of becoming and not in a pure or fixed state of eternal being. This in turn reveals that it is contingent, derived and dependent upon an outside force for its origin, order movement and transformation.

        The Big Bang Theory and the mutability of the universe clearly demonstrate that it is contingent and had a beginning and is therefore created and not eternal. It is also therefore an effect that must have a corresponding cause. This leaves us with a universe that is a derived, contingent and dependent upon a self-existent outside force or entity for its creation. This force or being must therefore also be of a higher order since it is eternal and transcends (i.e. – lives outside and independently of) the entire created universe including its framework of space and time. Further, under another form of general revelation, the Teleological Argument for the existence of God, is based on form and design found in the fully integrated structure, symmetry, harmony, order and purpose in nature and the cosmos. It can be shown that intelligent design is replete throughout nature, necessary for everything to work together and, simply to exist.

        This argument is broadly supported by diverse fields of science through physical properties, observations and established theory in Physics, Astronomy, Astrophysics, Cosmology, Astrobiology and Biochemistry. This includes the Rare Earth Hypothesis such as evidenced in “Privileged Planet”, numerous recent biological discoveries in molecular biology and genetics (e.g. – cell structure/processes, irreducible complexity, information coding in DNA), and the intricate integrated and precise design and interdependency of the laws of nature themselves. The extreme improbabilities associated with the simultaneous existence of these phenomena and natural properties as well as their integrated design and function, also demonstrate the clear impossibility of them being produced simply by random events.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

Trackback this post  |  Subscribe to the comments via RSS Feed


August 2006
M T W T F S S
« Jul   Sep »
 123456
78910111213
14151617181920
21222324252627
28293031  

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

%d bloggers like this: